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“Does not this show, indeed, that law derives its contents 
from the needs of the community for which it serves?”1 
“While the rights of private property are sacredly guarded, 
we must not forget, that the community also have [sic] rights; 
and that the happiness and well-being of every citizen depends 
on their faithful preservation.”2 
INTRODUCTION 
From small New England hamlets to major mid-Atlantic 
cities to sea-side California counties—in largely unnoticed 
fashion—at least 150 local governments across the country 
have adopted ordinances proclaiming “community rights” and 
a right to self-governance that defy long-established legal 
norms.  Though still nascent, the movement may be one of the 
most rebellious, and radical, in American local government 
today.  The movement also proposes, in part, to redefine the 
police power, the very foundation of local government 
regulatory capacity more often defined as the power to regulate 
for health, safety, welfare and morals. 
A review of several of the ordinances brings the movement 
into focus.  In 2006, Barnstead, New Hampshire passed the 
first Community Bill of Rights Ordinance to ban corporate 
water privatization.3  In 2010, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 
adopted a first-in-the-nation Community Bill of Rights 
Ordinance banning fracking.4  In 2014, Mendocino County, 
California, voters passed Measure S, the Mendocino County 
Community Bill of Rights Fracking and Water Use Initiative, 
which not only established “community rights” but also banned 
fracking as violation of those rights; banned the extraction or 
 
 1. W.G. HASTINGS,  THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE 
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE 555 (1900) (first major 
treatise on the police power discussing same). 
 2. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 422 (1837) 
(discussing nature of the police power). 
 3. Community Rights Papers, COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENTAL LEGAL 
DEFENSE FUND, http://celdf.org/community-rights-papers (last visited Jan. 12, 
2015). 
 4. Id. 
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sale of local water for use in fracking anywhere in the state; 
banned the dumping of toxic frack waste; and further banned 
the transfer of offshore fracking oil or waste through 
Mendocino County.5 
The community rights proclaimed by these ordinances are 
almost identical, typically invoking rights such as the right to 
pure water, clean air, peaceful enjoyment of home, a 
sustainable energy future, and the rights of natural 
communities.6  The radicalism of these ordinances is not so 
much the proclamation of such rights, but instead is the 
underlying legal claims they make to support such rights.  The 
ordinances announce that the local governments maintain a 
fundamental right of local self-governance, which they argue 
derives from the history of pre-Revolution local government 
autonomy that was preserved by the Declaration of 
Independence and the Ninth Amendment of the Constitution.7 
Further, the ordinances proclaim that this self-governance 
right trumps established norms of federal supremacy and 
preemption, as well as established norms of local government 
subordination to state governments ensconced in Dillon’s 
Rule.8  The ordinances also deny corporate personhood, and 
thus purport to strip corporations of the constitutional rights 
afforded to them.9  Each of these three justifications is as much 
a provocation as a serious legal argument; absent an upheaval 
of Supreme Court precedent that restructures state and 
federal power, as well as the rights of corporations, these 
rationales will certainly fail in the courts.  Indeed, as of this 
writing, at least one federal district court has struck down a 
community rights-based ordinance, though the case will likely 
be appealed.10 
Less provocative in nature, but arguably of more lasting 
significance, the ordinances also state, in the alternative, that 
the community rights announced constitute “the highest and 
best use of the police powers” of the local government.  Because 
 
 5. Mendocino County, California Adopts Community Bill of Rights Banning 
Fracking, COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENTAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, 
http://www.celdf.org/press-release-mendocino-co-ca-adopts-community-bill-of-
rights-banning-fracking (last visited Jan. 12, 2015). 
 6. See, infra, Section II(B)(1). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Swepi, LP v. Mora Cnty., N.M., No. CIV 14-0035 JB/SCY, 2015 WL 
365923 (D.N.M. Jan. 19, 2015). 
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the ordinances’ provisions are written as severable, the police 
power stands as an independent means of justifying the 
enumerated community rights.  In this way, the ordinances 
serve not only as a provocation attacking the foundations of 
supremacy, preemption, and corporate personhood, but also 
independently stand at the forefront in potentially redefining 
the police power as a rights-based doctrine. 
Redefining the police power as a rights-based doctrine 
would be a sea-change, but potentially not a change without 
historical precedent.  The municipal police power, of course, is 
often referenced as the ability of a local government to regulate 
to benefit the public health, safety, and welfare of a 
community.11  But that refrain has not always been the police 
power’s definition; indeed, in the Supreme Court’s famous late-
nineteenth century case, Charles River Bridge v. Warren 
Bridge, the police power was defined in terms of community 
rights: “While the rights of private property are sacredly 
guarded, we must not forget, that the community also have 
[sic] rights; and that the happiness and well-being of every 
citizen depends on their faithful preservation.”12  Might the 
police power, again, be defined as the rights of the community?  
If so, what might that mean for the scope of police power in the 
hands of local government?  Would it be a good idea? 
In light of these questions, this article uses the community 
rights movement as a means of investigating whether the 
police power, reconceived through the lens of rights, might be 
a sufficient rationale for supporting not only those rights 
enumerated by the community rights movement, but also other 
aspects of community that have previously been viewed as 
theoretical.  Moreover, this article seeks to investigate the 
legal complexities that would arise from defining the police 
power as a rights-based doctrine.  The article first proceeds, in 
Section I, to review the history of the police power.  Here, the 
police power’s origins, as well as its formulations as “residual 
sovereignty” and regulation for “health, safety, and welfare” 
are explored.  In Section II, this article then turns to 
investigating the rights claimed by the community rights 
movement, as well as the more radical and pragmatic 
justifications for claiming those rights.  Section III then turns 
to a more theoretical investigation of the notion of community, 
 
 11. See generally 6A McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 24:1 (3d ed. 2015). 
 12. 36 U.S. 420, 422 (1837). 
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both in legal history and in theory, for purposes of examining 
the outer limits of what may constitute the community for 
which rights may be reserved.  This section also investigates 
legal concerns arising from the community rights approach to 
the police power.  The final section offers concluding remarks 
and considerations for further investigation. 
I. A HISTORY OF THE POLICE POWER 
For over a century, legal scholars, and even the high 
court’s justices, have lamented the difficulty in defining the 
police power.  In 1895, one legal scholar would write that 
“[d]iscussions of what is called the ‘police power’ are often 
uninstructive . . . .”13  In 1907, an article in the Columbia Law 
Review entitled “What is the Police Power?” noted that, “No 
phrase is more frequently used and at the same time less 
understood” than the police power.14  In 2007, one hundred 
years later, an article on the police power proclaimed: 
The police power suffers from a surprising problem. Though 
it has been in constant use for many years and has proved 
important in the vocabulary of American constitutional law 
(indeed, it has been said to be “one of the most important 
concepts in American constitutional history”), it is, or 
stands for, one of the most misunderstood ideas in 
constitutional law. The meaning and implications of the 
term are far from clear.15 
Courts have equally given up on meaningful definition.  As the 
Supreme Court conceded in Berman v. Parker: “We deal, in 
other words, with what traditionally has been known as the 
police power. An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer 
limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts.”16 
Given that the police power is the workhorse of local 
government—the very enabling power that provides most 
cities their legal authority to act that is used hundreds, if not 
thousands, of times a day17—this centuries-long inability to 
 
 13. Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. Pa. 
J. Const. L. 745, 747 (2007) (quoting 1 JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, CASES ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 693 n.1 (1895)). 
 14. Walter Wheeler Cook, What is the Police Power?, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 322, 
322 (1907). 
 15. Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. Pa. 
J. Const. L. 745, 747 (2007). 
 16. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
 17. See generally 6A McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 24:1 (3d ed.) (discussing the 
breadth of police power’s application). 
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define the power in any meaningful way is not only 
remarkable, it may be of singular stature in American law.  
There is arguably no other aspect of law so ubiquitous and so 
incapable of definition; moreover, there may be no other area 
of law where courts and commentators have come to consider 
this as an acceptable status quo. 
This section provides a history of the police power as a 
means of understanding the import of the community rights 
movement to extend the frontiers of the power in contemporary 
legal frameworks.  Admittedly, this approach differs from the 
relatively small, but extant, literature on the police power, 
which tends to fall into one of three categories.  The first 
category of scholarship focuses on reconstructing the historic 
origins of the police power.18  Two major treatises were written 
on the police power at the turn of the twentieth century;19 
however, no major treatise has been published on the police 
power since Ernst Freund’s treatise published in 1904.20  The 
most authoritative explication of the contemporary state of the 
police power is in McQuillin’s local government treatise, which 
is essentially a three volume tome of several hundred years of 
conflicting court decisions.21  The second category of 
scholarship reviews the relationship between the police power 
and takings.  Of these articles, the most famous may be Joseph 
Sax’s Takings and the Police Power,22 which launched decades 
of responding articles trying to parse the police power through 
the Takings Clause.23  The third category of scholarship, 
 
 18. Walter Wheeler Cook, What is the Police Power?, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 322 
(1907); Robert Eugene Cushman, The National Police Power under the Commerce 
Clause of the Constitution, 3 MINN. L. REV. 289 (1919); Ray A. Brown, Due Process 
of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court, 40 HARV. L. REV. 943 (1927); James 
A. Tobey, Public Health and the Police Power, 4 N.Y.U. L. REV. 126 (1927); 
Thomas Reed Powell, Current Conflicts Between the Commerce Clause and State 
Police Power, 12 MINN. L. REV. 321 (1928); William A. Garton, Ecology and the 
Police Power, 16 S.D. L. REV. 261 (1971); Alan N. Greenspan, The Constitutional 
Exercise of the Federal Police Power: A Functional Approach to Federalism, 41 
VAND L. REV. 1019 (1988); Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police 
Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429 (2004); Santiago Legarre, The Historical 
Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745 (2007). 
 19. ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (1904); W.G. HASTINGS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW AS 
ILLUSTRATED BY THE DECISIONS RELATING TO THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE 
(1900). 
 20. Id. 
 21. MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. §§ 24:1–24:746 (3d ed. 2014). 
 22. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36 (1964). 
 23. Ross D. Netherton, Implementation of Land Use Policy: Police Power vs. 
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broadly speaking, reviews how the police power has been 
applied in a particular area of law, such as the regulation of 
obesity and high fat foods;24 motorcycle helmets;25 
contraception;26 gay marriage;27 sodomy;28 school 
desegregation;29 historic preservation;30 billboards;31 and 
zoning,32 to name but a few.  All of that said, the literature on 
the police power remains considerably smaller than any 
similarly seminal aspect of American constitutional law, and 
remains even conspicuously smaller in light of the weight the 
police power maintains as the very basis of most local 
government action. 
This article proposes five “eras” in police power history to 
give form to the discussion.33  These five eras are: the 
emergence of the concept of “police” in the Enlightenment, the 
intellectual forbearer of the police power; the rise of the police 
power as a force in local government during the late nineteenth 
century’s Industrial Revolution; the Lochner court’s use of 
substantive economic due process to dramatically limit police 
power regulations; the return of the police power as a broad 
power for local governments in the New Deal, which reached 
its zenith, arguably, in the articulation of the police power in 
 
Eminent Domain, 3 LAND & WATER L. REV. 33 (1968); William B. Stoebuck, Police 
Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057 (1980); Gerald 
Torres, Taking and Giving: Police Power, Public Value, and Private Right, 26 
ENVTL. L. 1 (1996); D. Benjamin Barros, The Police Power and the Takings 
Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 471 (2004). 
 24. Lawrence O. Gostin, et al., Assessing Laws and Legal Authorities for 
Obesity Prevention and Control, J. L. MED. & ETHICS 28 (2009); Glenn H. 
Reynolds & David B. Kopel, The Evolving Police Power: Some Observations for a 
New Century, 27 HASTINGS-CONST. L.Q. 511, 530 (2000). 
 25. Case Comment, Limiting the State’s Police Power: Judicial Reaction to 
John Stuart Mill, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 605, 614–17 (1970). 
 26. Michael J. Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The 
Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 689 (1976). 
 27. Raymand Ku, Swingers: Morality Legislation and the Limits of State 
Police Power, 12 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1 (1999). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, 
Concentrated Affluence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 1 (2006). 
 30. Case Comment, The Police Power, Eminent Domain, and the Preservation 
of Historic Property, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 708 (1963) 
 31. Mark Bobrowski, Scenic Landscape Protection under the Police Power, 22 
B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 697 (1995). 
 32. David M. Becker, The Police Power and Minimum Lot Size Zoning, WASH. 
U. L. Q. 263 (1969) 
 33. These five eras are based upon a synthesis of case law review and legal 
scholarship in this area. 
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Berman v. Parker; and finally, contemporary efforts of the 
conservative wing of the Court, for the last several decades, to 
use a “residual sovereignty” formulation of the police power to 
limit the scope of federal power under the Commerce Clause.  
Each of these eras will now be considered in turn. 
A. “Police” and the Enlightenment 
The term “police” emerged during the sixteenth century as 
a synonym for “policy,”34 a meaning that was obsolete by the 
nineteenth century.35  The first known official use of the term 
in English to connote the regulation and control of a 
community was in Scotland where, in 1714, Queen Anne 
appointed the “Commissioners of Police” for the general 
internal administration of the country.36 
The term “police” matured as a concept during the 
Enlightenment, though even then, there was substantial 
confusion as to what it connoted.37  Many legal scholars of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—Pufendorf, Vattel, 
Smith, and Blackstone among them—included some 
discussion of police in their summary treatises, though that 
section was often minor in relation to other matters.38 
Typical of the discussion of police in these treatises, and 
perhaps of greatest influence in English and American legal 
development, was Blackstone’s Commentaries.39  Blackstone 
discusses the police, or “polity”—another term he used 
synonymously with police—in several small discussions 
throughout his multi-volume Commentaries.40  The most 
salient reference for the development of the concept of police 
 
 34. For a detailed discussion of the etymology of the term “police,” see 
Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 745, 748–50 (2007) (discussing Greek, Latin, French, and Spanish 
antecedents). 
 35. 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 22 (2d ed. 1989); see also id. at 749. 
 36. Id. at 750. 
 37. Id. at 761.  A number of articles have previously presented this 
Enlightenment history, which is offered in a truncated form here.  See id. at 755 
(quoting THE BRITISH MAGAZINE OR MONTHLY REPOSITORY FOR GENTLEMEN & 
LADIES 542 (1763).  (“The word police has made many bold attempts to get a 
footing. I have seen it more than once strongly recommended in the papers; but 
as neither the word nor thing itself are much understood in London, I fancy it 
will require a considerable time to bring it into fashion. . . .”)). 
 38. Id. at 751–61. 
 39. Id. at 757–61; William Blackstone, 4 COMMENTARIES ch. 13, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk4ch13.asp. 
 40. 4 COMMENTARIES, supra note 39, at 162. 
2015] COMMUNITY RIGHTS 683 
was Book IV where Blackstone proclaims: 
By the public police and oeconomy [sic] I mean the due 
regulation and domestic order of the kingdom: whereby the 
individuals of the state, like members of a well-governed 
family, are bound to conform their general behaviour to the 
rules of propriety, good neighbourhood, and good manners; 
and to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their 
respective stations.41 
However, Blackstone’s categorization of police would 
likely confound contemporary understandings.  For instance, 
Blackstone’s discussion of police occurs in his book on “public 
wrongs”42 where other discussions focus on legal concepts like 
nuisance.43  In his discussion of police, Blackstone confusingly 
employed both a broad and a narrow definition of the “police,” 
which were different than the broad and narrow meanings of 
the police power that later emerged.44  The broad definition 
included offenses against the “commonwealth or public polity 
of the kingdom,”45 where “polity” and “police” were 
synonymous.46  At the same time, Blackstone subdivided this 
category of offenses into offenses against public justice, public 
trade, public health, and the “public police or oeconomy.”47  In 
this narrow formulation, the police power is only some subset 
of offenses.48  What the “police” entailed were not clear at all, 
even to Blackstone.  Further, other Enlightenment legal 
scholars differed with Blackstone’s description of police, and 
there was considerable fluidity in the concept at the time.49 
The concept of police was also known in the American 
colonies and to drafters of the Constitution.  For instance, 
Alexander Hamilton refers to police twice in the Federalist 
Papers, in both instances referring to it as the “mere domestic 
police” of a state or local government, which he believed were 
“insignificant” in comparison to federal powers.50  On the one 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See generally id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. 4 COMMENTARIES, supra note 39, at 162. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 745, 751–59 (2007) (discussing differing interpretations of police by 
Smith, Vattel, and Pufendorf). 
 50. THE FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The regulation of the 
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hand, Hamilton’s use of the term police indicates that it was 
operative within the milieu at the time; on the other hand, 
Hamilton’s language exhibits a disinterest in the subject, much 
less whatever connotations of local power he associated with it.  
Independent of the term “police,” James Madison, also writing 
in the Federalist, referred to the States’ “residuary and 
inviolable sovereignty over all other objects” not enumerated 
as powers of a federal government.51  Madison’s “residual 
sovereignty” formulation of the police, however, historically 
held little sway and was seldom used outside of the 
Federalist.52 
After independence was declared, a number of state 
constitutions—including those of New York, South Carolina, 
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Vermont—were drafted with 
explicit provisions mentioning police, several with a common 
phrase retaining for the state the “inherent right of governing 
and regulating the internal police.”53  By the time of the 
Constitutional Convention in 1787, the idea that states 
retained the right to regulate and govern the police seemed 
 
mere domestic police of a State appears to me to hold out slender allurements to 
ambition.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 34 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The expenses 
arising from those  institutions which are relative to the mere domestic police of 
a  state, to the support of its legislative, executive, and judicial  departments, 
with their different appendages, and to the encouragement of agriculture and 
manufactures (which will comprehend almost all the objects of state 
expenditure), are insignificant in  comparison with those which relate to the 
national defense.”). 
 51. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison). 
 52. W.G. HASTINGS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE 
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE 363 (1900) (“The 
remnant of power left in the states, after making room for this federal ‘supreme 
law of the land,’ is called by the authors of The Federalist the ‘residuary 
sovereignty,’ but that name seems not to have obtained generally, perhaps 
because it served no one’s political needs. It is hard to find it outside of The 
Federalist. It suited those who wished to magnify the states and who feared the 
growth of power on the part of the national government to omit the qualifying 
adjective.”). 
 53. Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 745, 775 (2007) (quoting MD. CONST. of 1776, DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS, art. II; N.C. CONST. OF 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. II).  Several 
states adopted this language with slight variations.  See DEL. CONST. OF 1776, 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. IV (“That the people of this state have the sole 
exclusive and inherent right of governing and regulating the internal police of the 
same.”); PA. CONST. OF 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. III (“That the people 
of this State have the sole, exclusive and inherent right of governing and 
regulating the internal police of the same.”); VT. CONST. OF 1777, DECLARATION 
OF RIGHTS, art. IV (using language identical to that in the Pennsylvania 
Constitution).  See id. at 775. 
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generally acknowledged.54 
The role of the police in relation to the Constitution also 
appears to have been on the minds of delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention. 55  There was no agreement, 
however, on how explicitly the Constitution should refer to the 
police.  On July 17, 1787, nearly mid-way through the four-
month Convention, Roger Sherman of Connecticut proposed an 
amendment prohibiting the federal government from 
“interfer[ing] with the government of the individual States in 
any matters of internal police which respect the government of 
such States only, and wherein the general welfare of the 
United States is not concerned.”56  Sherman’s proposal, along 
with three other attempts to insert amendments explicitly 
referencing police into the Constitution, was rejected by the 
Convention.57 
Instead, the Constitution contains three provisions that 
arguably address the police power indirectly.  The most 
commonly cited provision reserving the police power to the 
states is the Tenth Amendment, which provides that “[t]he 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”58  Recently, the Supreme Court 
and scholars have also pointed to two additional provisions in 
the Constitution that arguably buttress the reservation of the 
police power to the states.  The first of these additional 
provisions is Article I, Section 8, which articulates that the 
federal government is one of enumerated powers, beyond 
which, the Lopez Court and its progeny have forcefully noted, 
lay the State’s police powers.59  In addition, libertarian scholar 
Randy Barnett has further argued that the Ninth Amendment, 
as well as the Reconstruction-era Fourteenth Amendment, 
provide an express recognition of unenumerated rights, which 
limit the police power’s application against individual rights, 
regardless of whatever powers the Constitution may have 
otherwise reserved to the states through the Tenth 
 
 54. Id. at 776. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 776–77. 
 58. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 59. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.  See also U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (“The 
Constitution . . . withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police power that would 
authorize enactment of every type of legislation.”). 
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Amendment or Article I of the Constitution.60 
The common understanding today, however, remains that 
the police power was delegated to the States through the Tenth 
Amendment.61  This purported reservation, though, common as 
it is today, was of little consequence for almost a century after 
ratification of the Constitution and Bill of Rights. 
B. The “Police Power” and the Industrial Revolution 
The first use of the term “police power” in U.S. Supreme 
Court jurisprudence was Justice John Marshall’s reference in 
the 1827 case of Brown v. Maryland, where he remarked that 
“[t]he power to direct the removal of gunpowder is a branch of 
the police power, which unquestionably remains, and ought to 
remain, with the States.”62  There were prior instances when 
the Court, and Justice Marshall, in particular, made reference 
to the police in off-handed ways; however, the “police power” 
emerged out of Brown v. Maryland as a new term reflecting an 
idea that, in that time, was essentially something like 
Blackstone’s definition of the term, if otherwise without clear 
definition.63 
The use of the term grew, in fits and starts, throughout the 
nineteenth century.  A turn-of-the-century history of the police 
power noted that the term was not defined in Bouvier’s Law 
Dictionary, the “standard legal dictionary” of the time, in any 
of its numerous nineteenth century editions until the police 
power finally appeared in an 1883 edition.64 
Five major developments in the police power concept 
occurred as it came into popular use in the late nineteenth 
century as cities increasingly utilized regulations to curb the 
negative effects of the Industrial Revolution.65 
 
 60. Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 429, 431 (2004). 
 61. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. and Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 
U.S. 264, 291 (1981) (“The Court long ago rejected the suggestion that Congress 
invades areas reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment simply because it 
exercises its authority under the Commerce Clause in a manner that displaces 
the States’ exercise of their police powers.”). 
 62. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 443 (1827). 
 63. Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 745, 783  (2007). 
 64. W.G. HASTINGS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE 
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE 359–60 (1900). 
 65. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
§ 8.2.1 (2011) (“Beginning in the 1870s, government regulation significantly 
increased as industrialization changed the nature of the economy.”). 
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First, courts came to view the police power as a substitute 
for two generalized doctrines arising from common law.  The 
first doctrine, salus populi suprema lex, derived from Cicero, is 
typically translated as “let the good of the people be the 
supreme law.”66  For instance, in Boston Beer Co. v. State of 
Massachusetts,67 the Supreme Court noted that the police 
power belongs “to that class of objects which demand the 
application of the maxim, salus populi suprema lex; and they 
are to be attained and provided for by such appropriate means 
as the legislative discretion may devise.”68  The second maxim, 
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laeda, was noted as inclusive 
within the police power in the Slaughter-House Cases: 
‘Unwholesome trades, slaughter-houses, operations 
offensive to the senses, the deposit of powder, the 
application of steam power to propel cars, the building with 
combustible materials, and the burial of the dead, may all,’ 
says Chancellor Kent, . . . ’be interdicted by law, in the 
midst of dense masses of population, on the general and 
rational principle, that every person ought so to use his 
property as not to injure his neighbors; and that private 
interests must be made subservient to the general interests 
of the community.’ This is called the police power.69 
While the Court had determined that the police power was 
inclusive of salus populi and sic utere, the Court was clearly 
still working to sketch out the nature of the police power in its 
entirety.  As the Court also noted of the police power in the 
Slaughterhouse Cases, “it is much easier to perceive and realize 
the existence and sources of [the police power] than to mark its 
boundaries, or prescribe limits to its exercise.”70  That lack of 
boundaries or limits, however, did not limit the police power’s 
rise. 
Second, the Court flirted with multiple means of signifying 
the police power.  One of those approaches followed the 
Madisonian intimations of the police power as “residual 
sovereignty.”71 For instance, in Munn v. People of State of 
Illinois, the Court could announce that the police powers “are 
 
 66. CICERO, DE LEGIBUS, Book III, part III, sub. VIII; see also 6A McQuillin 
Mun. Corp. § 24:10 (3d ed.) 
 67. 97 U.S. 25 (1877). 
 68. Id. at 33. 
 69. 83 U.S. 36, 62 (1872). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
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nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent 
in every sovereignty, . . . that is to say, . . . the power to govern 
men and things.”72  At the same time, the invocation of the 
police power grew to its now-more-familiar formulation arising 
out of the works like Blackstone’s Commentaries, which spoke 
of—in some combination—public health, safety, welfare, and 
morals.73  For instance, in the landmark case of Mugler v. 
Kansas, the Court noted: 
It belongs to that [legislative branch of government] to 
exert what are known as the police powers of the State, and 
to determine, primarily, what measures are appropriate or 
needful for the protection of the public morals, the public 
health, or the public safety.74 
While this enumerated formulation became commonplace, 
it was not initially clear whether this definition was more 
narrow than the Enlightenment discussions of “residual 
sovereignty.”  However, as the Court was largely deferential 
when deploying this newly enumerated formulation in the late 
nineteenth century, the definition was at least broadly 
conceived even if not viewed as equivalent with sovereignty. 
Independent of the extent of the police power under either 
of these formulations, a third major development in the police 
power also arose in this time: the Court’s clear exertion of 
judicial review over the legislative exercise of police power.  In 
Mugler v. Kansas,75  the Court had to decide whether a state 
law prohibiting the manufacture or sale of alcohol within the 
state violated the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court’s 
decision was the first to announce some substantive component 
to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,76 and 
with that decision came the Court’s announcement that it 
could review police power enactments and mandate a 
requirement of reasonableness: 
The police power cannot go beyond the limit of what is 
 
 72. Munn v. People of State of Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1876). 
 73. See generally 6A McQuillin Mun. Corp. §§ 24:12, 24:13 (3d ed.) (noting 
cases discussing object of police power to the safeguarding of the public order, 
health, safety, and morals). 
 74. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887). 
 75. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. 273, 291 (1887). 
 76. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 
(1992) (“[F]or at least 105 years, since Mugler v. Kansas [citation omitted], the 
[Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause] has been understood to contain a 
substantive component as well, one ‘barring certain government actions 
regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.’ “). 
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necessary and reasonable for guarding against the evil 
which injures or threatens the public welfare in the given 
case, and the legislature, under the guise of that power, 
cannot strike down innocent occupations and destroy 
private property, the destruction of which is not reasonably 
necessary to accomplish the needed reform; and this, too, 
although the legislature is the judge in each case of the 
extent to which the evil is to be regulated or prohibited.77 
The Court more clearly announced this two-part test of 
Court review of police power in Lawton v. Steele,78 providing 
that the state had to justify the use of the power by showing 
(1) “that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished 
from those of a particular class, require such interference”; and 
(2) “that the means are reasonably necessary for the 
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive 
upon individuals.”79  As the Lawton Court concluded, “what is 
a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, 
but is subject to the supervision of the courts.”80 
As a corollary to the reasonableness requirement, a fourth 
important development as to the extent of the police power also 
took shape in this era: the relation of the police power to 
individual rights.  On the one hand, the Court announced in 
Boston Beer Co. v. State of Massachusetts, “All rights are held 
subject to the police power of the State.”81  In other words, a 
fundamental component of the police power is that it 
prioritizes public over private interests.82  On the other hand, 
the Court held in this era, and in numerous decisions 
thereafter,83 that federal and state constitutionally-protected 
individual rights form an outer boundary of the police power.  
Wrestling between these two poles—the police power’s 
 
 77. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. 273, 291 (1887). 
 78. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136–38 (1894). 
 79. Id. at 138. 
 80. Id. 
 81. 97 U.S. 25, 32 (1877). 
 82. See generally 6A McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 24:5 (3d ed.) (citing numerous 
cases where courts have noted that a “distinguishing characteristic of the police 
power is that it is a reasonable preference of public over private interests”). 
 83. See, e.g., Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 112 (1911), amended, 
219 U.S. 575 (1911) (“With regard to the police power, as elsewhere in the law, 
lines are pricked out by the gradual approach and contact of decisions on the 
opposing sides.”); American Federation of Labor v. Swing 312 U.S. 321, 325–26 
(1941) (“That a state has ample power to regulate the local problems thrown up 
by modern industry and to preserve the peace is axiomatic.  But not even these 
essential powers are unfettered by the requirements of the Bill of Rights.”). 
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prioritization of community rights and the simultaneous outer 
reaches of constitutionally protected individual rights has not 
been an easy task for the Court. 
In Barbier v. Connolly,84 for example, the Court struggled 
with the proper balance between the police power and 
individual rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The 
Barbier Court noted that neither the Fourteenth Amendment, 
“broad and comprehensive as it is—nor any other amendment, 
was designed to interfere with the . . . police power, to prescribe 
regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, 
and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase 
the industries of the state, develop its resources, and add to its 
wealth and prosperity.”85  This required “[s]pecial burdens” 
that were “often necessary for general benefits.”86  Such 
burdens, even if “special in their character,” did not “furnish 
just ground of complaint if they operate[d] alike upon all 
persons and property under the same circumstances and 
conditions.”87  If the legislation was “carrying out a public 
purpose,” “limited in its application,” and “within the sphere of 
its operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated,” it 
did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.88 
Fifth, the relationship between the police power of states 
and the commerce power of the federal government was 
clarified.  In the License and Passenger Cases, the primary 
concern was whether state police power and federal commerce 
power overlapped, or whether they defined mutually exclusive 
spheres of authority.89  The answer, which has been drawn into 
stark relief in our own time, was that states may act upon 
matters also regulated by the federal government, but only so 
long as the federal government has not otherwise preempted 
state action.90  For instance, in the License Cases, the Court 
held that “State power, and especially police power, may be 
exercised upon matters within the jurisdiction and under the 
control of the United States without incompatibility or 
repugnance. The protection of life, health, and property 
 
 84. 113 U.S. 27, 5 S. Ct. 357 (1887). 
 85. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1884). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. D. Benjamin Barros, The Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 471, 474 (2004). 
 90. See infra Section I(E). 
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demand it.”91  The only limitation federalism imposed was that 
such laws’ exercise could not “defeat[ ] or subvert[ ] the power 
of the United States,” in which case the law would be viewed 
as “incompatible or repugnant” of federal supremacy.92  The 
proper division between federal commerce power and state 
police power has, in our own time, come to be a matter of great 
debate, as discussed later in this article.93 
C. Lochner’s Liberty 
The Lochner era is often viewed as the time in which the 
Court held a broad view of the substantive due process 
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. In particular, the 
Court found a liberty of contract within those requirements 
that permitted a means-ends analysis wielded to overturn 
economic regulation.94  Seldom discussed in today’s 
commentary is that the legislation overturned by the Lochner-
era Court was premised on the police power.  Indeed, one of the 
legacies of Lochner was not only the substantive economic due 
process line of reasoning, but also the Court’s discussion and 
re-framing of the police power in those years.  This was not lost 
on those legal scholars writing at the time of Lochner, however.  
A steady stream of scholarship at the time sought to give voice 
to the changes and, moreover, tried to shore up the police 
power as a concept on which economic regulation, as well as 
other community-minded regulations, might stand.95 
One of the more important questions of the police power 
during the Lochner era was whether the enumerated 
formulation of the police power—the regulation of public 
 
 91. Thurlow v. Com. of Mass., 46 U.S. 504, 527 (1847). 
 92. Id. 
 93.  See infra Section I(E). 
 94. 1 LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1346 (3d ed. 2000). 
 95. See, e.g., Charles Warren, A Bulwark to the State Police Power-The United 
States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 667 (1913); Robert Eugene Cushman, 
The National Police Power under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 3 
MINN. L. REV. 289 (1919); Ray A. Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and 
the Supreme Court, 40 HARV. L. REV. 943 (1927); Thomas Reed Powell, Current 
Conflicts Between the Commerce Clause and State Police Power, 12 MINN. L. REV. 
321 (1928).  In addition, it is also worth noting that arguably the most 
comprehensive treatise on the police power ever written was published the year 
before Lochner was decided.  See ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC 
POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (1904).  Its publication was undoubtedly 
influenced by the Court’s turn toward a narrow reading of the police power in 
previous cases.  See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICIES § 8.2 (2011) (discussing earlier cases). 
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health, safety, welfare, and morals—was broad and similar to 
the extent of sovereignty, or an intentional narrowing of the 
concept.  For instance, by 1919, in the case of Dakota Cent. Tel. 
Co. v. South Dakota ex rel. Payne, the Court announced that, 
“[T]he words ‘police power’ [are] susceptible of two 
significations, a comprehensive one embracing in substance 
the whole field of state authority and the other a narrower one 
including only state power to deal with the health, safety and 
morals of the people.”96  But this was somewhat disingenuous, 
because there were few regulations that used the residual 
sovereignty formulation, and thus the real question was 
whether the enumerated formulation should be conceived of as 
narrow or broad. 
This reading, which framed the enumerated formulation 
as narrow as against a purportedly broad residual sovereignty 
formulation, eliminated a third obvious option that had been 
common in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century: 
that the enumerated formulation itself might also be a broad 
grant of power.  This narrow reading of the enumerated 
formulation was aided by Lochner v. New York itself.  Lochner 
tested whether a New York law limited the hours worked by 
bakers interfered with the “right of contract” that the Court 
then found to be “part of the liberty of the individual protected 
by the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”97  New 
York’s law restricting bakers’ hours had been premised on the 
police power.  Lochner’s statement of that power finds itself 
reduced, and pilloried, for its lack of definition.  For instance, 
the Lochner Court notes that “There are . . . certain powers, 
existing in the sovereignty of each state in the Union, 
somewhat vaguely termed police powers, the exact description 
and limitation of which have not been attempted by the 
courts.”98  The new skeptical tone is followed by a restatement 
of the police powers as existing “without, at present, any 
attempt at a more specific limitation related to the safety, 
health, morals, and general welfare of the public.” 99  The 
Lochner Court continues, “[b]oth property and liberty are held 
on such reasonable conditions as may be imposed by the 
governing power of the state in the exercise of those powers, 
 
 96. Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota ex rel. Payne, 250 U.S. 163, 185–
86 (1919). 
 97. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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and with such conditions the 14th Amendment was not 
designed to interfere.”100 
The Lochner Court further announced that previous cases 
of the Court have “recognized the existence and upheld the 
exercise of the police powers of the states in many cases which 
might fairly be considered as border ones.”101  The “right of 
contract” of both employers and employees was framed against 
the “the right of the state to prevent the individual from 
laboring, or from entering into any contract to labor, beyond a 
certain time prescribed by the state.”102  In this way, the 
Lochner Court evinced several rationale that, in its era, 
created a narrow scope of police power.  Lochner reasoned, in 
part, that the limitation on baker’s hours was not a “health 
law,” but instead an illegal interference with the rights of 
individuals, both employers and employees, to make contracts 
regarding labor upon such terms as they may think best.103 
The implication from this line of reasoning is that the 
enumerated formulation of the police power—health, safety, 
welfare, and morals—is not merely illustrative of powers or a 
legal term of art for something akin to sovereignty.  Instead, 
the Lochner Court takes that enumerated formulation to 
mean, precisely, that the regulation of “health” means, in fact, 
only health, and so on with the other enumerated terms.  This 
narrow formulation is buttressed by language at the end of 
Lochner, which notes that: “It is impossible for us to shut our 
eyes to the fact that many of the laws . . . passed under what is 
claimed to be the police power for the purpose of protecting the 
public health or welfare, are, in reality, passed from other 
motives.”104 This clearly indicates that, in the eyes of the 
Lochner Court, the police power is nowhere near equivalent to 
sovereignty, but instead narrowly limited to enumerated 
powers that, in Lochner’s reasoning, are paltry and sham when 
compared to the well-articulated individual rights found by the 
Court in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The impact of this hobbled formulation of the police power 
over the subsequent years of the Lochner Court was 
evocatively illustrated by a 1927 Harvard Law Review article, 
which quantified the Court’s review of state and local 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 54. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905). 
 104. Id. at 64. 
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legislation approved pursuant to the police power.105  Between 
1868 and 1912, only six percent of police power-enabled 
legislation reviewed by the Court was held unconstitutional.106  
Between 1913 and 1920, the figures did not change much: just 
seven percent of police-power enabled legislation was held 
unconstitutional.107  However, between 1921 and 1927, twenty 
eight percent of police-power enabled legislation that was 
reviewed by the Court was held unconstitutional.108  In other 
words, by the Twenties, the police power had become weak, 
overruled over a quarter of the time in the high court, because 
of the Lochner Court’s narrow reading of the enumerated 
formulation. 
D. Berman’s  Delimitation 
The Lochner era ended with a series of New Deal-era 
decisions that affected the police power in perhaps unexpected 
ways.  Namely, the enumerated formulation of the police 
power—the public health, safety, welfare and morals 
formulation that Lochner had read strictly as limited to those 
stated purposes—was again given broad interpretation and 
broad powers. 
Nebbia v. People of New York109 was among the New Deal 
cases that reinvigorated the broad reach of the police power.  
Its formulation of the police power will sound familiar: “[W]hat 
are the police powers of a State? They are nothing more or less 
than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty 
to the extent of its dominions.”110  This represented the return 
to a broad reach of the police power.111 
 
 105. Ray A. Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court, 
40 HARV. L. REV. 943 (1927). 
 106. Id. at 945. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
 110. Id. at 524–25. 
 111. Id. (“Thus has this court from the early days affirmed that the power to 
promote the general welfare is inherent in government.  Touching the matters 
committed to it by the Constitution the United States possesses the power, as do 
the states in their sovereign capacity touching all subjects jurisdiction of which 
is not surrendered to the federal government . . . . These correlative rights, that 
of the citizen to exercise exclusive dominion over property and freely to contract 
about his affairs, and that of the state to regulate the use of property and the 
conduct of business, are always in collision.  No exercise of the private right can 
be imagined which will not in some respect, however slight, affect the public; no 
exercise of the legislative prerogative to regulate the conduct of the citizen which 
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The formulation is, in fact, almost identical to that broad 
conception of the police power that was evidenced by decisions 
of the late nineteenth century.  By mid-century, the broad 
interpretation of the enumerated formulation would reach its 
zenith in Berman v. Parker, in which the Court upheld an 
urban renewal plan to tear down a blighted section of 
Washington D.C. while announcing: 
We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been 
known as the police power. An attempt to define its reach 
or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn 
on its own facts. The definition is essentially the product of 
legislative determinations addressed to the purposes of 
government, purposes neither abstractly nor historically 
capable of complete definition. Subject to specific 
constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, 
the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh 
conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, 
is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by 
social legislation . . . .112 
The Berman Court continued: 
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law 
and order—these are some of the more conspicuous 
examples of the traditional application of the police power 
to municipal affairs. Yet they merely illustrate the scope of 
the power and do not delimit it . . . .  The concept of the 
public welfare is broad and inclusive . . . . The values it 
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as 
well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature 
to determine that the community should be beautiful as 
well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as 
well as carefully patrolled.113 
The police power that emerges out of Berman114 is about 
as far as the Court could get from Lochner while still speaking 
of the enumerated formulation.  Not only is the enumerated 
formulation of the police power not “delimited” by its 
enumerated formulation, as Berman puts it, but the police 
power’s breadth goes beyond mere state craft to encompass 
 
will not to some extent abridge his liberty or affect his property.  But subject only 
to constitutional restraint the private right must yield to the public need.”). 
 112. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31–32 (1954). 
 113. Id. at 32–33 (1954). 
 114. Compare Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 519 (2005) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“More fundamentally, Berman and Midkiff erred by 
equating the eminent domain power with the police power of States.”). 
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aspirations of aesthetics, beauty, cleanliness, spirit and 
“balance.”115 
In addition to this broad scope, Berman also exhibits a 
profound deference: the legislative act is “well-nigh conclusive” 
after Berman.  Indeed, in the world of land use regulation, 
Berman became the bulwark of a whole bevy of new 
regulations that were buttressed by the scope of its soaring 
rhetoric, deference to legislative determinations, and seeming 
annoyance with “fruitless” parsing of police power doctrine.116  
After Berman, the police power became the de facto authority 
to justify almost every local governmental action.  When local 
governments act, other authorities may be cited, but the police 
power is always there, as well. 
E. Residual Sovereignty and the Commerce Clause 
In the contemporary Court, both conservative and liberal 
justices still generally refer to the police power through its 
enumerated formulation of health, safety, welfare, and morals; 
t is also still common that the Court views those police powers 
broadly.117  Nonetheless, in cases where the Court has sought 
to limit the scope of the Commerce Clause, the Court has 
chosen to refer to the police powers in a manner that is in line 
with the Madisonian residual sovereignty formulation and 
does not mention the enumerated formulation—broadly or 
narrowly conceived—at all. 
U.S. v. Lopez,118 in which the Court overturned a gun 
control law enacted upon the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce 
Clause, was the first of these contemporary cases to use the 
police power as a limitation on the federal commerce power.  
The form of the residual sovereignty argument is simple, even 
if three of the five justices in the Lopez majority found there to 
be sufficient reason to file concurring opinions to the majority 
 
 115. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 116. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 117. Several recent cases are illustrative.  See, e.g., Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc. v. 
Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2483 (2013) (“we start from the ‘assumption that the 
historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by [a] Federal Act 
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ” ); U.S. v. 
Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2507 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“I write 
separately to stress not only that a federal police power is immaterial to the result 
in this case, but also that such a power could not be material to the result in this 
case—because it does not exist.”). 
 118. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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opinion.119  Writing for the majority in Lopez, Justice 
Rehnquist begins by noting that the federal government is one 
of enumerated powers.120  To rule for the government in this 
case, he argued, would require the Court “to pile inference 
upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert 
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a 
general police power of the sort retained by the States.”121  For 
purposes here, it is sufficient to note simply that the outer 
bounds of the federal commerce power, as Rehnquist frames it, 
is the State’s police power. 
This line of reasoning was also picked up in Lopez’s 
concurring opinions.  Justice Thomas, in a lengthy concurrence 
focused heavily upon the police power, noted that, 
Although we have supposedly applied the substantial 
effects test for the past 60 years, we always have rejected 
readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal 
power that would permit Congress to exercise a police 
power; our cases are quite clear that there are real limits to 
federal power. . . . Indeed, on this crucial point, the majority 
and Justice BREYER agree in principle: The Federal 
Government has nothing approaching a police power.122 
Indeed, it is Justice Thomas, in this concurrence, who most 
forcefully invokes the police power not only as a limit of the 
federal commerce power, but also as a statement of what 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 566 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819) 
(“Th[e] [federal] government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated 
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 121. Id. at 567–68.  See also U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 599–600 (1995) 
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cede a police power to the Federal Government, our Commerce Clause’s 
boundaries simply cannot be “defined” as being “ ‘ commensurate with the 
national needs’ “ or self-consciously intended to let the Federal Government “ 
‘defend itself against economic forces that Congress decrees inimical or 
destructive of the national economy.’ ” ). 
 122. Id. at 600. 
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federal power is not. 
Justice Souter’s dissent in Lopez illustrates the novelty of 
Justice Thomas’ turn of phrase.  Justice Souter notes, “it was 
really the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 that 
opened a new age of congressional reliance on the Commerce 
Clause for authority to exercise general police powers at the 
national level.”123  In other words, at the time of Lopez, at least 
one justice held no compunction of discussing “police powers” 
as existing at the federal level.  For Souter, “police power” was 
indicative of a type of power that might be exercised, perhaps 
even in overlapping spheres, by federal and state agents. 
Nonetheless, the Lopez majority’s line of analysis was 
furthered in the next major decision that rebuffed the federal 
commerce power, U.S. v. Morrison,124 which overturned the 
Violence Against Women Act that had similarly been enacted 
based upon the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause. In 
Morrison, the Court again used the police power as an outer 
bounds of the Commerce Clause.  The Court noted, “[t]he 
Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly 
national and what is truly local, and there is no better example 
of the police power, which the Founders undeniably left 
reposed in the States and denied the central 
Government. . . .”125 
The Court also made clear that it was establishing a line 
of reasoning with Lopez and Morrison, citing extensively from 
their previous discussions of the police power’s limitations on 
the Commerce Clause.126  Justice Thomas, in his concurrence 
in Morrison, furthered the cause: “Until this Court replaces its 
existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence with a standard more 
consistent with the original understanding, we will continue to 
see Congress appropriating state police powers under the guise 
 
 123. Id. at 604–05 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 124. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 125. Id. at 599. 
 126. Id. at 618–19 (“Indeed, we can think of no better example of the police 
power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the 
States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.  See, 
e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 (“The Constitution . . . withhold[s] from Congress a 
plenary police power.”); id. at 584–85 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[W]e always have 
rejected readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal power that 
would permit Congress to exercise a police power”), 596–597, 597 n.6 (noting that 
the first Congresses did not enact nationwide punishments for criminal conduct 
under the Commerce Clause.”). 
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of regulating commerce.”127 
More recently, this line of police power reasoning has 
made its mark on arguably the most important Commerce 
Clause decision of a generation: the Court’s decision, in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,128 
which held that provisions of the Affordable Care Act were not 
supported by the federal commerce power on which the law 
was, in part, enacted.  The Court’s reasoning, again, deploys 
the residual sovereignty formulation of the police power.  The 
Court’s analysis followed the analysis previously displayed by 
Lopez and Morrison, citing the precedents of Gibbons v. Ogden, 
McCulloch v. Maryland, and the reference to the enumeration 
of federal powers in Article I of the Constitution.129  However, 
the Court then offers an analysis of state’s rights, which 
culminates in the importance of the police power, again, as the 
limit against which the federal Commerce Clause must not go 
further: 
The Constitution may restrict state governments—as it 
does, for example, by forbidding them to deny any person 
the equal protection of the laws. But where such 
prohibitions do not apply, state governments do not need 
constitutional authorization to act. The States thus can and 
do perform many of the vital functions of modern 
government—punishing street crime, running public 
schools, and zoning property for development, to name but 
a few—even though the Constitution’s text does not 
authorize any government to do so. Our cases refer to this 
general power of governing, possessed by the States but not 
by the Federal Government, as the “police power.”130 
Unlike in Lopez and Morrison, however, where the Court 
felt it sufficient to simply name the police power as the outside 
limit of federal commerce power, the Court goes further in 
Sebelius: 
State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: Rather, 
federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from 
the diffusion of sovereign power.” New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 181, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 
(1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the 
 
 127. Id. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 128. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2576–78 (2012). 
 129. Id. at 2577. 
 130. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618–619, 120 S.Ct. 
1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000). 
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police power is controlled by 50 different States instead of 
one national sovereign, the facets of governing that touch 
on citizens’ daily lives are normally administered by 
smaller governments closer to the governed. The Framers 
thus ensured that powers which “in the ordinary course of 
affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the 
people” were held by governments more local and more 
accountable than a distant federal bureaucracy. The 
Federalist No. 45, at 293 (J. Madison). The independent 
power of the States also serves as a check on the power of 
the Federal Government: “By denying any one government 
complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, 
federalism protects the liberty of the individual from 
arbitrary power.”131 
 On the one hand, it could be argued the use of the police 
power as the foil against which to reign in the federal 
commerce power, does not tell us much about how the Court 
now views the nature of the police power itself.  The police 
power could simply be viewed as a convenient tool by which to 
achieve the Court’s true objective: reigning in the federal 
commerce power.  On the other hand, recognizing that the 
police power has become the rhetorical tool against which to 
limit federal power provides several insights.  First, it assists 
in understanding that the Court is using a broad formulation 
of state and local power for purposes of reigning in federal 
power.  Second, it is worth noting that the rhetorical 
formulation for achieving this end is not the police power’s 
enumerated formulation—health, safety, welfare, and 
morals—which is the formulation the Court typically uses 
when otherwise validating police power regulations by the 
Court.  Instead, in these cases, the Court turns to the 
Madisonian residual sovereignty formulation of the police 
power.  Recognizing this helps to bring to light how the police 
power’s lack of definition, much less its rhetorical fluidity, 
enables both liberal courts—as in Berman—and conservative 
courts—as in Lopez, Morrison, and Sebelius—to apply the 
same power to different ends under different rhetorical guises. 
An awareness of this rhetorical move of the conservative 
wing of the Court facilitates understanding of how the Court 
has utilized the residual sovereignty formulation of the police 
power to reign in a broad federal Commerce Clause power.  
 
 131. Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 2364, 180 
L.Ed.2d 269 (2011). 
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Prior to these decisions, it was not uncommon for both the 
Commerce Clause and the police power to be interpreted 
broadly—Berman’s precedent ran co-terminous with the most 
broadly decided of federal commerce power cases, such as 
Nebbia and its progeny, for much of the middle twentieth 
century—and no conflict of powers was found over decades of 
expanding federal, state, and local regulation.  The insistence 
on a stark divide between sovereigns may be the legacy of how 
the police power has been presented in its contemporary 
residual sovereignty formulation here. 
F. In Sum 
This history has traced the evolution of the police power 
from its obscurity in late modern thought, through the 
Enlightenment and American Revolution and into Supreme 
Court precedent, finally resting with the police power’s 
ubiquitous use in city halls today.  This history provides a 
context for the three definitions of the police power that emerge 
over time.  The first definition is the “residual sovereignty” 
concept of Madison, which also retained use in the late 
nineteenth century and has been revived by the contemporary 
conservative wing of the Court to oppose federal Commerce 
Clause power; the second definition is the narrow Lochner 
interpretation of the police power as limited to the enumerated 
formulation of public health, safety, welfare, and morals; and 
the third definition is the broad interpretation of the 
enumerated formulation, which was at times almost 
synonymous with residual sovereignty in the late nineteenth 
century and, after Berman, was again broadly conceived—no 
longer “delimited”—by its enumerated terms and still grants a 
high degree of deference to this day.132 
While many aspects of the police power are not discussed 
here, such as the affirmative obligations of the power,133 this 
 
 132. Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 745, 793 (2007). 
 133. See, e.g., Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class 
Transformation, Concentrated Affluence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 
8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 52 (2006) (“On the other hand, the lion’s share of attention 
to the police power has been negative, with debate over the limits that the rights 
of property place on the scope of exercise of the police power.  Little, if any, 
attention has been paid to the other dimension of the police power: what inherent 
affirmative obligations does the exercise of the police power impose on those who 
would wield its mighty sword?  In particular, what are the inherent obligations 
that municipalities, to whom the police power has devolved, have in the exercise 
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section demonstrates that the police power remains a fluid 
concept with great import for the powers of local governments.  
Moreover, the extent of those powers is often waged through 
rhetorical formulations of the power.  The importance of such 
rhetorical formulations in framing the police power is what 
makes the community rights movement, even if still nascent, 
of considerable interest to the future of the police power.  How 
might a community rights formulation of the police power 
strengthen, or weaken, the powers of state and local 
governments in general, or as against the federal government? 
II. THE COMMUNITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
The community rights movement has largely been spurred 
on and orchestrated through the work of the Community 
Environmental Legal Defense Fund (CELDF),134 a left-leaning 
advocacy group with interests in environmental causes that, 
nonetheless, maintain positions remarkably similar to some 
far-right libertarian groups that prioritize local control.  While 
CELDF is the intellectual center of the movement, the concepts 
they espouse have clearly hit a stride with community leaders 
across the country, as over 150 local governments have adopted 
a version of CELDF’s Community Bill of Rights Ordinance 
template with relatively minor modifications.  In some local 
governments, the ordinances have been passed into law 
through ballot initiatives, indicating that the community 
rights mantel is popular in some local communities.  This 
section proceeds by first investigating the “community rights” 
that the ordinances typically provide.  Then, the section looks 
at some of the more radical legal claims the ordinances propose 
and their rationales.  Finally, the section investigates whether 
such community rights may be supported by the ordinances’ 
police power rationales. 
A. “Community rights” enumerated 
Although the community rights ordinances evince some 
variation, most are similar to those announced by Baldwin, 
Pennsylvania (Baldwin Ordinance), which includes the right to 
“pure water,” “clean air,” “peaceful enjoyment of home,” a 
“sustainable energy future,” the “rights of natural 
 
of the police power? In other words, what is the general welfare?”) 
 134. COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENTAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, 
http://www.celdf.org/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2015). 
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communities,” and the “right to self government.”135  The 
Baldwin Ordinance was chosen for review from over 150 
community rights ordinances not because it has any especially 
unique language but because it is largely in accordance with 
and representative of the majority of the community rights 
ordinances. 
The Baldwin Ordinance enumerates several “community 
rights,” all of which focus on environmental concerns.  The first 
such community right announced is the “right to pure water.”  
The provision states: 
All residents, natural communities and ecosystems in 
Baldwin Borough possess a fundamental and inalienable 
right to sustainably access, use, consume, and preserve 
water drawn from natural water cycles that provide water 
necessary to sustain life within the Borough.136 
This community right is provocative in several ways.  First, it 
grants a fundamental right related to water not only to 
residents, but also to non-person subjects—”natural 
communities” and “ecosystems”—within the local 
government’s jurisdiction.  CELDF has since used language 
provisions such as this to assert legal standing for 
ecosystems.137  The rights of natural communities provision 
states: 
Natural communities and ecosystems, including, but not 
limited to, wetlands, streams, rivers, aquifers, and other 
water systems possess inalienable and fundamental rights 
to exist and flourish within Baldwin Borough. Residents of 
the Borough, along with the Municipality, shall possess 
legal standing to enforce those rights on behalf of those 
natural communities and ecosystems.138 
This provision specifically provides for legal standing of 
natural communities and ecosystems implicit within prior 
provisions.  Moreover, this provision asserts a right to “exist,” 
perhaps most associated with a sustainability approach to 
 
 135. Borough of Baldwin, Penn., Ordinance No. 838, Banning the Commercial 
Extraction of Natural Gas within the Confines of the Borough (June 2011) §§ 
3(a)–(f) [hereinafter BALDWIN ORDINANCE]. 
 136. Id. § 3(a). 
 137. See First-in-Nation: Ecosystem Files to Defend Legal Rights to Exist & 
Flourish, COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENTAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND (Jan. 12, 2015), 
http://www.celdf.org/press-release-first-in-nation-ecosystem-files-to-defend-
legal-rights-to-exist—flourish. 
 138. BALDWIN ORDINANCE § 3(b). 
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environmental law, and to “flourish,” which might be 
associated with restoration and resilience concepts in modern 
environmental law. The right to a sustainable energy future 
provision states: 
All residents, natural communities, and ecosystems in 
Baldwin Borough possess a right to a sustainable energy 
future, which includes, but is not limited to, the 
development, production, and use of energy from renewable 
fuel sources.139 
Such a community right arguably has implications beyond 
simply conservation, but also establishes a right to energy that 
could presumably be asserted against state statutes governing 
oil and gas production, state public utilities regulations, or 
even federal energy regulatory bodies that might propose 
energy projects that would affect the local government. 
Undoubtedly, anyone familiar with the complexities of the 
areas of law covered by these substantive community rights 
realize that they almost certainly conflict with established 
legal precedents.  That is surely the point; CELDF, and those 
communities that are adopting these community rights 
ordinances, are intending to challenge the status quo, which 
they believe is established by a chummy alliance of state, 
federal, and corporate interests.  To better understand their 
position and why they would engage this line of reasoning, a 
closer review of the underlying rationale on which they assert 
such community rights rely is required. 
B. The power to proclaim “community rights” 
The community rights movement has announced two legal 
arguments that support local governments’ ability to proclaim 
community rights.  The first is a radical argument based upon 
facially challenging established norms of corporate, federal, 
and state power.  The second is a more nuanced argument 
based, simply, upon the police power.  This section considers 
both arguments in turn. 
1. The Radical Argument: Self-Governance as a 
Fundamental Right 
The community rights ordinances first proclaim a 
fundamental right to self-governance, which is important to 
 
 139. Id. § 3(c). 
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the legal rationale for these ordinances.  For instance, the 
Baldwin Ordinance, typical of these ordinances, provides: 
Right to Self-Government. All residents of The City of 
Broadview Heights possess the fundamental and 
inalienable right to a form of governance where they live 
which recognizes that all power is inherent in the people, 
that all free governments are founded on the people’s 
authority and consent, and that corporate entities and their 
directors and managers shall not enjoy special privileges or 
powers under the law which make community majorities 
subordinate to them.140 
Though local governments, with the help of CELDF, have 
elaborated on this argument at length, its salient points can 
best be summarized by reviewing CELDF’s amicus briefs, 
which have provided the following analysis.141 
First, the ordinances argue that there is a fundamental 
right to self-governance.  In declaring this right, CELDF points 
to the fundamental right test of Griswold, which provides that 
“when considering whether a right is a fundamental right, the 
court [must] look to whether it is a right “deeply rooted in this 
nation’s history and tradition.”142 At the federal level, CELDF 
argues that the right of self-governance is deeply rooted in the 
country’s history going back to the Mayflower Compact,143 that 
self-governance was “the cause of the American Revolution,”144 
and that self-governance is the foundation of the Declaration 
of Independence.145  In particular, they argue that the Ninth 
Amendment, which provides that “the enumeration in the 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny 
 
 140. Id. § 3(d). 
 141. CELDF is typically in the position of filing amicus briefs because lawsuits 
arising over the ordinances are typically between an aggrieved resident or 
corporation and the local governmental entity that has adopted a community 
rights ordinance.  Although CELDF has played a significant role in drafting and 
advising these ordinances, the group’s legal standing is not as a party to the 
action. 
 142. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) 
 143. Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings at 9, Pennsylvania General Energy Company, L.L.C. v. Grant 
Township (W.D. Pa.) (No. 1:14-CV-209) [hereinafter CELDF MEMORANDUM].  The 
author made contact with attorneys at CELDF who stated that the CELDF 
MEMORANDUM discussed in this article is the best statement of the merits of the 
case.  E-mail from Thomas Linzey, Executive Director, Community 
Environmental Legal Defense Center, to author (Dec. 15, 2014, 14:09 MST) (on 
file with author). 
 144. CELDF MEMORANDUM at 14. 
 145. Id. at 18. 
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or disparage other rights retained by the people,” intended to 
retain natural rights to the People.146  Among those 
fundamental rights retained by the People is the ability to 
“alter or abolish their form of government whenever they see 
fit.”147  They also argue that self-governance is the origin of 
state constitutions.148 
Under this general framework, the CELDF then makes 
three specific claims.  First, they argue that constitutional 
rights guaranteed by corporate personhood violate the 
community right to self-governance established by community 
rights ordinances like the Baldwin Ordinance.149  They argue 
that corporations are creatures of state law, and that the 
Constitution protects the people against both the state and its 
creatures.150  They also challenge the rights granted to 
corporations by the courts under various amendments, but the 
legal argument is vague.  It appears the argument is that since 
legal personhood for corporations is a fiction violative of self-
governance, rights granted on the basis of that fiction are 
equally violative of the community self-governance right.151 
Second, CELDF argues that Dillon’s Rule infringes on the 
right to self-governance.152  Little known outside of the state 
and local government law context, Dillon’s Rule is a late-
nineteenth century set of statutory interpretation canons that 
sought initially to limit the powers of big city political 
machines and has since stood for the general proposition that 
local governments owe their existence to states and thus are 
subjects of state governments.  Dillon’s Rule, and the notion 
that local governments exist as creatures of the state, has 
always been known as a legal fiction: there is no doubt that 
many cities pre-dated existing U.S. state governments owing 
to cities’ origins as English, French, and Spanish colonial 
subjects.153  Nonetheless, for those states that have adopted 
Dillon’s Rule, the Rule’s canons have come to largely, if not 
universally, define the legal standing of local governments as 
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subordinate to states.154  Despite this century of established 
precedent, the CELDF challenges Dillon’s Rule and its progeny 
as violative of the right of self-governance.155 
Third, and perhaps most radically, the CELDF argues that 
preemption should act as a floor, rather than a ceiling, to 
regulation.156  Despite this claim, the argument here appears 
not to challenge the doctrine of constitutional supremacy—a 
sure loser—but rather to challenge the sheer rise of federal and 
state preemptive laws that the Center argues are typically 
written at the behest of corporations and that limit local self-
governance.157 
Although novel in its scope, the CELDF’s argument faces 
a number of legal hurdles in light of existing state and federal 
constitutional principles.  For instance, the central premise of 
self-governance as a fundamental right of local government is 
problematic as the Supreme Court has not, in fact, recognized 
self-governance as a fundamental right.  Further, the 
challenges to corporate rights, Dillon’s Rule, and preemption 
all are antithetical to established precedents of the last 
century.  CELDF is presumably aware of this: the very point of 
their critique appears to be that such precedents are, in the 
grand scope of American law, relative newcomers.  Instead, 
CELDF is urging a return to an era they argue is more in line 
with the original vision of American law, an era before mid-
nineteenth century corporate personhood, before the late-
nineteenth century rise of Dillon’s Rule, and before an era 
when federal and state laws routinely preempted local decision 
making.  That, CELDF seems to argue, was a time of local self-
governance more closely aligned with the founding documents 
of the country. 
CELDF may win some of these legal claims, but perhaps 
these radical claims are better viewed as provocations.  Even 
if CELDF loses these claims under established norms, they 
might still succeed in opening a conversation about corporate 
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 157. Id. at 30 (“Business corporations are a species of property.  The doctrine 
of corporate constitutional “rights” gives the constitutional rights of people to this 
property. Then, when local government enacts a law that a corporation dislikes, 
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rights, Dillon’s Rule, and the prevalence of preemption that 
could lead to more power for local governments.  At least one 
district court, as of this writing, has felt otherwise, and largely 
rejected these claims.158 
2. The Pragmatic Argument: The Police Power and 
Community Rights 
The community rights ordinances also contain a less 
provocative claim to legitimacy: they are supported by 
language stating that they are exercises of the municipal police 
power.  For instance, the Baldwin Ordinance provides that, 
“the protection of residents, neighborhoods, and the natural 
environment constitutes the highest and best use of the police 
powers that this municipality possesses.”159  Given that the 
ordinances also contain a severability clause, all of the 
provocative claims of legitimacy discussed previously—self-
governance and the violations of self-governance by corporate 
rights, Dillon’s Rule, and preemption—could be struck down, 
and the substantive community rights could still survive if a 
court held that they were within a local government’s police 
powers.  As a result, another way to view the community rights 
ordinances is purely as a matter of substantive community 
rights—clean water, clean air, sustainable energy, rights of 
natural communities, and beyond—all falling within the 
“delimited” powers of the police power.  Viewed in this light, 
the community rights movement could well be the most 
substantive challenge to the established norms of the police 
powers limits in contemporary legal thought.  It is also the 
most substantive effort to frame the police power as a matter 
of community rights, perhaps the most coherent effort to do so 
since the Supreme Court’s discussion of community rights in 
Charles River Bridge.160 
Although not as provocative as the ordinances’ challenge 
under self-governance as a right, the potential for police power 
to support community rights might ultimately prove to be a 
more profound shift in local government law.  If the police 
power were viewed not only as the ability of a local government 
to regulate for public health, safety, welfare, and morals, but 
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also to establish community rights, it would provide a new 
formulation of the police power doctrine with largely unknown 
results.  The following section explores aspects of community 
rights that illustrate this uncertainty, both potentially for good 
and ill. 
III. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF THE POLICE POWER 
AS A COMMUNITY RIGHTS DOCTRINE 
The community rights movement posits that the police 
power may be reformulated as an embodiment of community 
rights; a further investigation is invited to contemplate the 
implications of such a change.  This section proceeds in three 
parts.  First, this section investigates several sociological and 
theoretical inquiries as to what defines a community.  These 
investigations help to elucidate the social dimensions of 
community that, in turn, help to clarify some of problems with 
implementing rights at a community level.  Second, this 
section investigates several legal obstacles to implementing a 
community rights formulation of the police power.  Third, this 
section investigates some of the benefits that could arise from 
a community rights vision of the police power. 
A. The Trouble with “Community” 
Gertrude Stein once quipped of her hometown, Oakland, 
California, “There is no there there.”161  Later, in 2005, several 
artists erected a sculpture on the border between Oakland and 
Berkeley that was simply enormous letters reading “HERE” on 
the Berkeley side and “THERE” on the Oakland side near the 
cities’ jurisdictional bound.162  The sculpture illustrates an 
important problem with community as a legal concept: the 
relative there-ness of community and the here-ness of another 
involves boundaries.  Sometimes these boundaries are 
jurisdictional, but often they are social, not easily defined, and 
 
 161. GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (1937, 1971 ed.). 
 162. Carolyn Jones, Berkeley: No tea cozy for ‘There’ sculpture, S.F. CHRON., 
June 2, 2010, available at http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Berkeley-No-
tea-cozy-for-There-sculpture-3263028.php.  In 2010, several artists, feeling that 
the sculpture was an insult to Oakland, knitted an enormous tea cozy to the “T” 
on the Oakland side, ostensibly to equalize the cities’ “here”-ness.  The original 
artist of “HERETHERE,” for his part, said he meant no reference to Stein’s 
famous line, but instead meant for the sculpture to be “neutral, as in ‘neither here 
nor there,’ or as a compliment to Oakland, as in ‘the grass is always greener over 
there.’ ”  
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erected or dissolved over time with the fluctuations of real 
estate markets.  Sometimes city boundaries make a difference; 
sometimes not.  In fact, one of the chief problems with 
community as a concept—not just as a legal principle but as a 
concept for any sort of rigorous inquiry—is that demarcating 
the here-ness and there-ness of community is a challenging, 
perhaps even insurmountable, task to achieve with any 
precision.  Although conducted over fifty years ago, one of the 
most poignant examples of community’s elusiveness is the 
1955 study by sociologist George A. Hillery, Jr.  Hillery gave 
himself an almost insurmountable task: categorize extant 
definitions of community.163  His study remains one of the most 
comprehensive efforts of its kind.  Hillery catalogued 94 
definitions of community from prominent sources finding that 
they illustrated 16 non-exclusive concepts in their 
definitions.164  There was no perceptible pattern to the 
definitions that pointed towards consensus.165  Hillery’s results 
catalogued nearly a century’s worth of social science efforts to 
come to grips not just with an elusive concept of community, 
but also with social forces that were changing the nature of 
community in dramatic fashion.  Hillery’s study lays bare the 
difficulty in pursuing a rigorous exploration of community 
where strict definitions are sought, for instance, in law, where 
ambiguity and vagueness are eschewed.  Still, the difficulty of 
the enterprise does not doom it; instead, this section seeks to 
offer several brief summaries of sociological studies that, in 
turn, assist in understanding the prospect of community as a 
legal concept. 
1. Neighborhoods’ Rights 
For many urban dwellers, community is not the 
jurisdictional bound of the city, but instead the confines of the 
neighborhood.  Yet, defining a neighborhood, like defining a 
community, is a complicated task.  As one prominent 
sociologist, Albert Hunter, noted, a neighborhood is “a social/
spatial unit of social organization, and that it is larger than a 
household and smaller than a city. The problem with 
presenting a further list of definitive characteristics is that 
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they often become normative rather than descriptive.”166  In 
other words, objective classification of a neighborhood, 
whether by size, characteristics of residents, or physical 
characteristics, ultimately represents the priorities of the 
person engaging in the classification. 
Several definitional components of neighborhoods are 
useful to consider, however.  First, neighborhoods have a 
“concentric geography” to them; in other words, there is a built 
environment that is physically connected.167  This is important 
in distinguishing neighborhoods from other forms of 
community that may flourish virtually online, across town, and 
across jurisdictional lines.  Second, neighborhoods often have 
overlapping borders, which means that the ambiguous nature 
of boundaries is a persistent definitional problem that also has 
legal and policy implications.168  Third, neighborhoods change 
over time, often because of a lack of local organizations, but 
also because of other social pressures and social dynamics.169  
For instance, nineteenth century brownstone neighborhoods of 
Brooklyn have given shelter to Walt Whitman, Jewish 
immigrant communities, African American communities, and 
hipster enclaves.  The “community” that embodied the 
“neighborhood” changed over time. 
Fourth, there is substantial variation in how individuals 
relate to their neighborhoods.170  How an individual 
experiences the sense of community in a neighborhood has 
been the source of a tremendous body of research.  
Neighborhood involvement, having young children, or being 
married, elderly, a homeowner, or a long-time resident in the 
neighborhood have all been found to lead to a stronger sense of 
community.171  If factors as varied as these affect how people 
relate to the neighborhood, so, too, would they affect the 
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perceived rights that should be afforded to the community. 
Further, the physical design of the neighborhoods may 
also affect a sense of community including “diverse, urban 
environments; the character, design, and architectural quality 
of the neighborhood; the availability of structured public and 
semiprivate space; and the presence of local stores and 
neighborhood facilities.”172  This indicates that urban design 
may well play an important role in how residents feel about 
their neighborhood and, as a result, whether that 
neighborhood should be afforded particular rights. 
All of this indicates that while the feeling of community 
can be an important social value that cities need to foster for 
the vitality of its existing residents and as a means of 
encouraging in-migration, converting that sense of place into 
legal rights is a daunting task.  There are at least three ways 
that community rights could prove problematic as related to 
neighborhoods.  First, there could be tension between the city 
leadership and the neighborhood, with both parties seeking to 
claim the mantle of community rights.  Second, there could be 
tensions between overlapping or adjacent neighborhoods, both 
of which may seek to influence an area or a proposal as within 
the domain of its community rights.  Finally, there could be 
intra-neighborhood conflicts and thus conflicting notions of 
who represented the community and its rights.  While each of 
these potential conflicts arguably already exists within the 
existing power struggles of cities exercising the police power, a 
turn to a community rights-based language could exacerbate 
these questions of belonging and turn them into legal 
questions. 
2. Propinquity and the Multiplicity of Communities 
Although neighborhoods remain a staple in the discussion 
of communities,173 modern technology and communication 
have also altered the nature of community identity that could 
also complicate efforts to assign rights at the community level.  
Since at least the Sixties, scholars such as Melvin Webber have 
argued that community has been inexorably altered and no 
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longer requires propinquity, the need for spatial closeness.174  
As Webber noted, “Americans are becoming more closely tied 
to various interest communities than to place communities”;175 
in other words, technology and transportation have made it 
possible for individuals to find like-minded individuals across 
town, and even across the world, and thus community no 
longer depends upon spatial ordering. 
Of course, the technology with the greatest potential for 
community-changing is the Internet, and a vast literature has 
emerged seeking to understand how the Internet is affecting 
community.176  By the turn of the twentieth century, it was 
already evident that the neighborhood was not the only form 
of community in which people engaged.  By that time, 
community was already “rarely based on local neighboring, 
densely-knit solidarities, organized groups, or public 
spaces.”177 Community members were more likely to interact 
in private spaces, such as households or phone lines, than in 
public spaces, such as street corners, parks, and cafes.178  In 
addition, people already had more friends outside their 
neighborhoods than within them,179 while many people had 
more ties outside their metropolitan areas than within them.180 
Research indicated that the Internet did little to alter 
these already existing conditions.  Indeed, an early, turn-of-
the-century study of Internet culture, which was based upon 
providing a neighborhood access to a neighborhood-only 
listserv, found that the Internet “intensified the volume and 
range of neighborly relations,” which included more 
recognition of neighbors, greater frequency of communication, 
both on and offline, and participation in the public and private 
realms.181  In other words, even though the Internet can 
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facilitate the creation of anonymous connections without 
propinquity, the Internet could also be used as a valuable tool 
to increase neighboring and community.  It is increasingly 
evident that technologies are seeking to foster this type of 
neighborliness within the traditional spatial relation, or 
propinquity, of community.  Take, for instance, the Internet 
community Nextdoor, which essentially uses a Facebook-style 
social media platform where membership is limited to those 
within defined neighborhoods.182 The popularity of such 
applications makes evident that the Internet can be a new tool 
for traditional neighboring as well as for forming and 
maintaining bonds around the world. 
This research indicates that, while community can be 
based upon propinquity, it is not a necessary condition 
especially given the transience and technology of today.  This 
raises complex questions for community rights in an era where 
community does not require propinquity.  In particular, local 
governments would be forced to consider how much weight to 
place upon community members not located in the 
community’s jurisdictional bounds but with an expressed 
interest in a particular project.  Arguably, local governments 
already do this to some degree; however, community rights 
could seemingly become a mechanism that would legally 
require a local government to consider extra-jurisdictional 
interests in the exercise of the police power. 
3. Communities’ Relationships, Weak and Strong 
Sociological research also indicates that what makes 
community function as community may not be its most obvious 
components, but instead its “weak ties.”  Efforts to define or 
empower communities with rights would seemingly need to 
also address how the legal empowerment of the community 
would affect—or not affect—these valuable, but often 
seemingly tangential, components of community identity. 
In 1973, Mark Granovetter published The Strength of 
Weak  Ties,183 a landmark article in which he posited a network 
systems theory of “strong ties” and “weak ties,” where “the 
strength of a tie is . . . [a] combination of the amount of time, 
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the emotional intensity, the intimacy. . . , and the reciprocal 
services which characterize the tie.”184  Strong ties involve a 
greater time commitment; those with strong ties are more 
similar in various ways and are more likely to become friends 
once they meet.185  In subsequent literature, “strong ties” have 
also been called “bonding ties,” such as those between people 
who know each other very well, such as family connections and 
connections between close friends.186  Weak ties are also 
referred to as “bridging ties” such as connections to people 
outside one’s own local groups.187 
The import of Granovetter’s article was the counter-
intuitive argument that weak ties could, in some instances, 
prove to be far more valuable than strong ties.  For example, 
those seeking to reach a large number of people will find that 
weak ties are a valuable resource because these weak ties are 
also “bridges,” meaning that they move across the cliques that 
strong ties reinforce.188  In the context of cities, Jane Jacobs 
referred to those weak ties with this bridging capacity as “hop-
skip people.”189  For instance, a job seeker might imagine that 
the best way to get a job is to get the word out to a person’s 
strong ties; however, Granovetter’s theory indicated that it was 
the weak ties, those that “move in circles different from our 
own” that “have access to information different from that 
which we receive” that ultimately are the most useful.190 
Granovetter also posited a theory of community 
involvement related to city urban renewal policies in an effort 
to understand why some communities work more easily toward 
common goals while others are “unable to mobilize resources, 
even against dire threats.”191  The example he chose to 
investigate was the Italian community of Boston’s West End 
and their inability to fight against the urban renewal policies 
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that “ultimately destroyed” the community.192 Granovetter 
found this “anomalous” because the West End social structure 
had been described as “cohesive,” and yet, the West End 
community had not mobilized successfully against urban 
renewal as successfully as other working-class communities 
had done.193  Granovetter posited that the reason the West End 
had not mobilized to fight urban renewal was counter-
intuitive: it had a lot of strong ties, few weak ties, and those 
weak ties were not “bridging” ties.  In other words, the West 
End was a place of strong families and lifelong friendships; 
however, those strong ties were highly fragmented from each 
other.194 
In contrast, Granovetter noted that Charlestown, a 
working-class Boston community that successfully organized 
against a similar urban renewal plan, “had a rich 
organizational life, and most male residents worked within the 
area.”195  These additional organizations and work relations 
provided weak ties that provided bridges between groups that 
allowed the neighborhood to rally against the city.196  
Granovetter argued that “for a community to have many weak 
ties which bridge, there must be several distinct ways or 
contexts in which people may form them,”197 and that, “the 
more local bridges in a community and the greater their 
degree, the more cohesive the community and the more capable 
of acting in concert.”198 
Although Granovetter proffered only a hypothesis in his 
article, the hypothesis was provocative in postulating why 
some communities band together in the face of neighborhood-
altering plans and others do not.199  Granovetter’s hypothesis 
also points to the political and legal implications of considering 
weak ties; indeed, it may be such weak ties that ultimately 
provide the kind of relations most valuable in fighting for the 
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community’s future.  In a community rights framework, then, 
there would arguably be some force to providing legal 
recognition to those weak ties that exist not only within the 
immediate community but elsewhere.  For instance, perhaps 
there are people who own or frequent businesses in the 
community but live elsewhere; people that used to live in the 
community, who now live elsewhere, but who retain an affinity 
for the community.  As a tangible example, some cities, such as 
Los Angeles, permit those who have a “factual basis” for an 
interest in a neighborhood to be a part of a neighborhood 
council upon filing an application with sufficient proof.200  
Presumably, a greater emphasis on community rights could 
enhance how those with such extra-territorial addresses but 
an interest in a community—whether conceived of as a city or 
a neighborhood—might attain a legal status with regard to 
governance of that community’s future not typically recognized 
by political or legal structures. 
4. Teaching Community as a Value 
A fourth way that sociological research might improve 
understanding as to how community rights would function has 
focused on the question of what makes individuals work for the 
common good.  A 2013 study conducted by researchers at 
Stanford provides some useful information about how subjects 
respond to community-oriented motivations, or interdependent 
actions, as opposed to individual-oriented motivations, or 
independent actions.201 
One of these studies is of particular import here.  In this 
online study, participants were presented two potential new 
course offerings at the university about environmental 
sustainability.202  Although the course descriptions were 
identical, student learning and participation were framed 
independently for one group, and interdependently for another 
group.203  The independent course frame told students “they 
would take charge of sustainable solutions, learn to work 
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autonomously, develop personal skills (e.g., “know your own 
perspective,” “be unique”), and cultivate expertise in individual 
action.”204  On the other hand, the interdependent course frame 
told students that they “would work together for sustainable 
solutions, learn to collaborate with others, develop skills for 
social coordination (e.g., “take others’ perspectives,” “be 
flexible”), and cultivate expertise in social action.”205  Students 
were then asked to rate how much effort they would put into 
the respective classes and also allocate funds to these 
courses.206  In response, those students of European American 
sociocultural contexts indicated less motivation for and 
allocated fewer resources to the course framed in terms of 
interdependent than independent behavior than did those 
students of Asian American sociocultural contexts.207 
The researchers concluded that, for European American 
sociocultural contexts, “acting independently is the most 
pervasive, promoted, valued, and psychologically beneficial 
style of behavior in mainstream.” 208  In such a context, 
“independence is the normative schema for thought and 
action,” one in which “ ‘ good’ behavior is characterized by 
acting autonomously, feeling in control, and determining one’s 
own outcomes free from others’ influence.”209  Motivating those 
with such a context to participate in community-based 
problems is best accomplished by encouraging people to “take 
charge” rather than to “work together.”210 
Further, the study concludes that, for community-based 
planning to become part of long-term social goals, “it needs to 
be valued and promoted in American worlds and by American 
selves to the same extent as independence is,” a conclusion 
buttressed by the study’s responses from students with an 
Asian American context.211  The study concluded: 
Until interdependence is more consistently and effectively 
represented in the ideas, practices, products, and 
institutions, successfully encouraging the perspective that 
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our destiny is ‘stitched together’ may require invoking 
independent behavior to achieve interdependent ends.212 
The study offers several lessons for community rights.  
First, it illustrates that the idea of community, as well as the 
relative weight to be placed on the concept, is tied to culture.  
In this case, the students of Asian American sociocultural 
contexts illustrated a greater connection to the concept of 
community than students of European American sociocultural 
contexts.  In America’s multi-ethnic and multi-racial cities, the 
varied sociocultural contexts likely offer a wide array of 
connections to the concept of community.  Whether these 
varied cultural relations should be provided community rights 
in varying degrees accordant to the expectations of the various 
communities is a question worth pondering. 
Further, the study also makes clear that the European 
American sociocultural context continues to prioritize 
individualized actions.  Therefore, to the extent that 
community rights seeks to be as powerful, or more powerful, of 
an invocation of the police power, it would need to offer a 
rebuttal to the preference for individualism that dominates 
today especially in these European American dominated 
communities. 
5. In Sum 
In the review of the sociological aspects of community 
above, the primary goal has been to give form to the 
malleability of the concept of community.  Given that the police 
power has proved difficult to define for nearly two centuries of 
constitutional law, perhaps there is no harm in linking the 
malleable concept of the police power to the malleable concept 
of community rights.  However, to the extent that an invocation 
of community rights as a new definition of the police power 
seeks to offer clarity, this review of the sociological literature 
indicates that community rights is likely only to offer another 
strain of complex analyses as complex and slippery as the 
concept of community itself. 
B. Legal Complexities of Community Rights 
Despite the complexities raised in the concept of 
community by sociological work, community rights faces an 
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even greater legal challenge: there is almost no discussion 
about the proposition of community rights exercised by a local 
government in modern legal circles.  Indeed, the American 
legal tradition has favored individual rights with such 
conviction that there has been almost no room for discussion of 
what rights might be afforded to communities.213  This section, 
therefore, seeks to provide a simple outline of the reasons why 
community rights have not taken hold in American 
jurisprudence, and also to outline the arguments from those 
few who do promote community rights. 
To the extent a conversation over non-individual rights 
has existed in American legal circles, it has defined itself 
around the concepts of “collective rights” or “group rights” of 
non-government associations.  Moreover, these movements of 
collective rights or group rights have most often been 
associated with those seeking to advance the interests of 
minority groups as against the government.  Such arguments 
have stalled, though, in part because of a perception that what 
successes minority groups have attained in achieving equality 
have come through vindicating those individual rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution.214  Even if collective or group 
rights had received favorable treatment in attaining favorable 
results for minority community as against the government, 
such victories would seemingly not be applicable to the police 
power as an exercise of community rights.  Collective or group 
rights of minorities have been sought as against a government 
entity; the proposition of community rights as an exercise of 
government power—as the community rights formulation of 
the police power proposes—would be inapposite to these 
efforts. 
Theoretical investigations into group rights have also 
 
 213. Bruce P. Frohnen, The One and the Many: Individaul Rights, Corporate 
Rights and the Diversity of Groups, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 789, 791 (2005) (“The 
Lockean individualist reading of the founding as the triumph of individual rights, 
along with the more generalized Whig reading of history as the unfolding of 
individual rights, continues to dominate contemporary discourse.  Moreover, 
contemporary liberal theorists have insisted on the continuing, paramount 
importance of individual rights as the grounding for any just order.”). 
 214. See William Bradford Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Rights: The 
Legacy of Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 995 (1984) (“We are, I submit, at a crossroads in 
the development of civil rights policy in this country.  We can adhere to the 
fundamental principles that got us this far and fight-as did the leaders of the civil 
rights movement in the 1960’s-for the rights of individuals, or we can continue 
the drift in the direction of race-conscious decisionmaking, elevating the interests 
of particular groups above the rights-the civil rights-of their members.”). 
2015] COMMUNITY RIGHTS 721 
granted such rights cold welcome.  Take, for instance, the 
following from Ronald Dworkin: 
The existence of rights against the Government would be 
jeopardized if the Government were able to defeat such a 
right by appealing to the right of a democratic majority to 
work its will. A right against the Government must be a 
right to do something even when the majority thinks it 
would be wrong to do it, and even when the majority would 
be worse off for having it done.215 
Those, such as Dworkin, worry that the government will 
seek to suppress individual rights through appeal to the 
collective sensibilities.  In this case, representing the police 
power as community rights could become a means of 
majoritarian suppression that so concerned Madison at the 
country’s founding. 
Another attack on the concept of collective and group 
rights has been the argument that collective or group rights 
are simply the aggregate of individual rights.  In this 
argument, community rights would be a kind of “double-
counting” 
Finally, if the police power were reimagined as the 
exercise of community rights, larger implications may arise.  
Consider, for instance, how standing requirements—long 
focused on the individual with exceptions for groups embodied 
in third-party standing requirements—would be implicated.  
Thus, a turn of the police power from its residual sovereignty 
formulation or public health, safety and welfare formulation to 
a rights-based formulation could have legal implications 
beyond a mere turn of rhetoric. 
Against these challenges, and others, a small but 
concerted effort to claim some voice for collective and group 
rights has emerged.  These scholars have made several 
arguments.  First, the Canadian scholar Dwight Newman has 
argued that certain collective rights are necessary to the 
exercise of individual rights.216  However, even to the extent 
that Newman argues for collective and group rights, his 
arguments are limited to the notion of the police power as 
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community rights in several ways.  First, Newman limits his 
arguments to moral rights, not legal rights.217  Second, 
Newman imagines his discussion of rights as being for groups 
seeking rights for the group as against the government, which 
would seemingly not apply to community rights as exercised 
by the government. 
While this is a cursory review of the legal landscape 
governing rights,  it proves sufficient to illustrate that there is 
little precedent within existing American legal practice or 
theory for collective, or “community” rights exercised by the 
government on behalf of the people, even if only at the local 
government level.  As a result, if such an approach were 
adopted for the police power it would open a new chapter in 
American law with little precedent. 
C. Potential Benefits of a Community Rights Formulation 
of the Police Power 
The previous sections have offered considerable reasons to 
be wary of community rights.  This section will now consider 
several reasons why why community rights could prove a 
valuable means of invoking the police power. 
First, the community rights movement offers a potentially 
new life for a rhetorical formulation of a rights-based police 
power all-but-forgotten.  As illustrated in Section I of this 
article, three rhetorical formulations of the police power have 
predominated since the police power came to prominence in the 
1880s.  Those three formulations are the Madisonian residual 
sovereignty formulation, the Lochner-ian narrow reading of 
the health, safety, and morals formulation, and the Berman 
broad reading of the health, safety and morals formulation.  
However, as the police power has no constitutional text to 
anchor it, its rhetorical invocation is arguably fluid.  For 
instance, as noted in Section I, the contemporary Court 
currently uses both the broad Berman enumerated formulation 
and the Madisonian residual sovereignty formulation of the 
police power.  A community rights-based rhetorical invocation 
of the police power could seemingly also be used to describe 
even the existing police power.  As noted previously, such a 
rhetorical formulation flows from the Court’s Charles River 
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Bridge decision, which noted that “the community also have 
[sic] rights” that are embedded within the police power.  
Although the language of Charles River Bridge seems to be the 
sole instance of the United States Supreme Court speaking of 
the police power as rights of the community, the rationale 
would arguably be equal to other formulations because there is 
no constitutional language defining the police power. 
A community rights formulation could provide more than 
just rhetorical flourish; as research discussed in Section III 
indicated, the willingness to take action for community is often 
influenced by how the community is perceived.  Local 
governments exercising the police power are often challenged 
by individuals seeking to exercise well-defined individual 
rights.  Against the definition of an individual right, the arcane 
invocation of public health, safety, and welfare or residual 
sovereignty holds little rhetorical sway.  The same claim of an 
individual right, when weighed against “community rights” 
may more appropriately explain the choice a local government 
faces in choosing to subordinate an individual interest in light 
of those of the community generally.  A rhetorical turn towards 
rights-based language could clarify for the public the choice 
between community interests and those of individuals that 
often weigh at the heart of local government decision-making. 
Second, a move towards community rights could have a 
substantive turn: it could, in fact, broaden the police power 
through recognition of enumerated community rights, such as 
those of the community rights ordinances, or others.  This 
could, for instance, arise through the validation of the 
community rights ordinances, discussed in Section II, that 
evince community rights to pure water, clean air, sustainable 
energy, and so on.  Under this kind of approach, there would 
likely emerge in police power jurisprudence lines of cases on 
specific community rights, perhaps foremost the enumerated 
formulations “public health,” “safety,” “welfare,” and “morals.”  
Whether this strengthened or weakened the police power 
would be a matter of how those rights were applied by courts. 
There is some reason to believe that such community 
rights could be interpreted more broadly than at present.  For 
instance, in Robinson Township, the court found that a state 
constitutional provision, the Pennsylvania Environmental 
Rights Amendment, required local governments to consider 
future generations in their land use decision making.  Some 
theoristshave similarly sought a way to consider future 
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generations within existing legal structures.218  A police power 
authority premised on community rights could welcome an 
investigation of future community members that seems more 
attenuated in an invocation of public health, safety, and 
welfare.  While Robinson Township addressed future 
generations in the context of environmental law, police power-
enabled consideration of future generations could also be 
relevant to other aspects of social life typically the concern of 
local governments, such as universal pre-kindergarten 
education, which has been shown to have long-term, positive 
impacts in increasing income and lowering violence.  To the 
extent that community rights permits a local government to 
envision, and act for, communities beyond those living, then a 
community rights approach to could prove a valuable 
formulation of the police power.  This is just one way to imagine 
the benefits that could be derived from a community rights 
vision of the police power. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The future of the community rights ordinances that are 
becoming increasingly fashionable among American local 
governments is questionable; many rest on largely untenable 
positions relative to supremacy and preemption, state law 
constructions of local government power, and corporate 
personhood doctrines all several centuries in the making.  
Regardless of the fate of those arguments, the popularity of the 
community rights movement indicates that it has fastened 
upon an approach to collective governance that is powerful and 
resonant. 
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Integrating community rights into established police 
power precedent is fraught with legal complications, however, 
given the American legal system’s preferences for individual 
rights and the complexities inherent in the concept of 
community itself.  It remains unclear what the result would be 
for daily practice in local governments. 
Should such a community rights approach to the police 
power come to nothing more than rhetoric, the turn to 
community rights from “health, safety, and welfare” or 
“residual sovereignty” formulations would, at a minimum, 
have the effect of giving new voice to a term that has, for nearly 
two centuries, been defined by phraseology that defies even 
those who have written treatises on it.  Whether that new 
phraseology would have legal import is unknown.  The history 
of the police power, however, tells us that the rhetorical 
formulation of the police power does have consequences, as the 
Lochner, Berman, Lopez, Morrison, and Sebelius decisions 
make evident. 
History further instructs that, through Charles River 
Bridge, there is precedent for considering the police power as 
an embodiment of community rights, however the courts may 
come to define that term.  Should the courts turn to Charles 
River Bridge and community rights as a formulation of the 
police power, there may be room for consideration of 
communities—existing and future—that have otherwise been 
alienated from legal power at the local level.  On the other 
hand, such a new formulation could be used, through the 
slippery terms of community, to oppress the rights of 
individuals that already form the outer bounds of the police 
power.  Whether proceeding on such an endeavor to redefine 
the amorphous, ill-defined police power is worth it will be the 
province of tomorrow’s judges and justices whose predecessors 
have, for nearly two centuries, chosen among various 
formulations of the police power and breathed life into them. 
